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Chapter 8
Implications of Pension Plan Features,
Information, and Social Interactions 
for Retirement Saving Decisions
Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez
There is growing concern in many nations about low levels of retirement
saving. For most US families, employer pensions are the main source of
cash income during retirement, over and above Social Security benefits
(Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1996). Yet, in the last 25 years, traditional defined
benefit (DB) and employer plans with mandatory employee participation
have steadily been replaced with Tax Deferred Account (TDA) retirement
plans such as 401(k)s and 403(b)s, where employees choose whether to par-
ticipate and how much to save for their retirement (Poterba, Venti, and
Wise, 2001). As a result, many US workers now must make decisions about
how much to save for their retirement, instead of being passive participants
in their employer’s DB pension plan. This makes it very important to under-
stand how retirement savings decisions are made.
Deciding how much to save is a complicated decision, which requires
processing a substantial amount of information and making intertemporal
tradeoffs. It is clear that many households lack the financial education
required to think about the saving problem as a standard intertemporal
optimization problem, let alone to find the optimal solution. It is, there-
fore, plausible to think that participation and investment decisions in
401(k)s will be affected by factors other than standard economic max-
imization. Indeed, the recent empirical literature on 401(k)s has identified
several of these channels: Default rules (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi
et al., 2003, 2004), the possibility to commit now for the future (Benartzi
and Thaler, 2004), information and peer effects (Bernheim and Garrett,
2000; Duflo and Saez, 2002, 2003; Madrian and Shea, 2002; and Choi and
Garrett, 2000, Chapter 7, this volume).
Some recent research is based on actual experiments, either natural
such as when a firm changes its retirement benefit policy, or prospective, in
The authors thank Abhijit Banerjee, David Card, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, and Olivia
Mitchell for very helpful comments and discussions. They gratefully acknowledge financial
support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0078535).
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a randomized trial design where researchers can evaluate the impact of
a specific channel on enrollment. The experimental approach has import-
ant advantages over previous analysis. First, it does not posit a priori models
of savings behavior, and therefore the results are not dependent on behavi-
oral assumptions. Second, experiments allow the researcher to raise new
questions and provide new evidence on questions deemed irrelevant in stan-
dard approaches. As a result, the scope of investigation of saving problems
has been considerably expanded so as to provide better understanding
of the determinants of saving. Finally, experiments can allow researchers to
develop research designs in order to answer very specific questions. We will
see that, in many instances, the answers to those questions are very sensitive
to the exact set-up, and therefore many experiments are called for in order
to yield a solid sense of the key elements affecting the decision to save for
retirement through employer sponsored benefit plans.
The goals of this chapter are twofold. First, we summarize the key
features of the findings from studies that have used experimental or quasi-
experimental methods. In our view, four main facts emerge from the liter-
ature. First, default rules in employer retirement benefits plans have a very
important impact on retirement savings decisions. As Madrian and Shea
(2001) have strikingly shown, shifting from the default rule in 401(k) plans
from no-enrollment to automatic enrollment has a dramatic impact on the
enrollment rates of new employees, and thus effect persists for several
years. Second, the ability to commit now for the future also influences the
willingness to participate. The “Saving More Tomorrow” plan proposed by
Benartzi and Thaler (2004), whereby employees can decide to allocate
automatically a fraction of their future pay raises to 401(k) contributions,
produced a dramatic increase in the level of 401(k) savings. Third, network
effects seem to be important. Duflo and Saez (2002) show that employees’
enrollment and contribution choices are influenced by the choices of col-
leagues within departments, within a large university. Fourth, information
has some impact on participation decisions, but this effect is fairly small.
Duflo and Saez (2003) conduct an experiment showing that attendance to
information sessions on retirement benefits within a single large university,
has a significant effect on the subsequent 401(k) enrollment rates.
Finally, we will identify the gaps in the existing knowledge and propose
new randomized experiments. Most of these could be conducted in the
workplace, and they would fill important gaps in our understanding of the
determinants of retirement savings.
What Experiments Have Shown Thus Far
Default Rules and Commitment
Several studies have analyzed how changes in the default rule for 401(k)
enrollment and contributions within a single large firm influences the enroll-
ment rates of new employees (Madrian and Shea, 2001). Enrollment rates for
138 Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez
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new employees increased from about 50 to over 80 percent. After the change,
over three quarters of new employees remained in the default money market
fund allocation, even though very few employees hired before automatic
enrollment picked this particular outcome, and a money market fund is
unlikely to be the optimal investment for long-term retirement savings.
How should we interpret the evidence on the impact of default rule? One
possibility is that people do not take the time to make decisions about their
401(k) decision, or they assume that the firm has made the right choice for
them. A different possibility is that the small cost involved in calling the
benefits office to drop out of the 401(k) plan is actually large enough to pre-
vent people from “acting on impulse,” to disenroll. This second explanation
recognizes that people can make short-run decisions that will hurt them in
the long run: The value of today’s consumption is very high, relative to the
value of consumption in any future period. This means that, the individual
will actually regret having consumed too much today, in the future. By
enrolling employees by default, the firm provides employees with a commit-
ment device. Even though the commitment is not particularly constraining,
it appears sufficient to protect individuals from themselves.
If this is in fact the right explanation, then individuals should actually
value the opportunity to commit themselves for the future by enrolling in the
401(k). The problem, however, is that in order to enroll today, they must give
up consumption today. They would rather start giving up consumption start-
ing tomorrow. The “Save More Tomorrow” (SMT) experiment developed by
Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler (2004) was meant to test exactly the
possibility that workers would be willing to commit today to save future salary
increases. Their analysis gave employees in a mid-sized company the option
to commit in advance to allocate a portion of their future salary increases
toward retirement savings. The vast majority of people (78 percent) who
were offered the SMT plan elected to use it, and the vast majority of those
who joined remained in it through at least three pay raises. Average contri-
bution rates in the 401(k) plan for SMT plan participants increased from
3.5 to 11.6 percent of pay, over the course of 28 months.
Information and Peer Effects
Several studies have investigated whether peer effects play an important role
in retirement savings decisions. Using individual data on employees of
a large university, Duflo and Saez (2002) study decisions to enroll in the
401(k) plan along with the choice of the mutual fund vendor for people
who choose to enroll. The research question was whether people are influ-
enced by the decisions of other employees in the same department. Results
consistently suggest that peer effects are important: There is little difference
in participation within departments, but larger variance in participation
rates across departments, and individual participation rates are correlated
with predicted participation in their peer groups.1
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An interesting related experiment also sheds light on the role of informa-
tion and social interactions in decisions to enroll in 401(k) retirement
plans (Duflo and Saez, 2003). Here, a random sample of employees in a
subset of departments was encouraged to attend a benefits information fair
organized by the employer, who offered them a $20 monetary reward for
attendance. We set a variable D  1 were the treated departments where
some letters were sent and by D  0 were the control departments where
no letters were sent. Within the treated departments, each employee not
previously enrolled in the 401(k) plan had a probability 1/2 of receiving
the letter promising the $20 monetary reward for attendance. We denote
by L  1 the treated employees who did receive the letter, and by L  0 the
employees who did not. Our experiment included only employees not yet
enrolled in the 401(k) shortly before the fair.
Attendance rates at the benefits fair are reported for each group in Panel A
of Table 8-1. For employees in control departments (D  0), the fair atten-
dance rate was only 5 percent, whereas in treated departments (D  1), the
fair attendance rate was above 20 percent. Within treated departments, the
attendance rate was 28 percent for employees who received the letter, more
than five times larger than in control departments. Interestingly, the atten-
dance rate of employees in treated departments who did not receive the
letter was 15 percent, three times higher than in control departments, even
though those employees did not receive a monetary reward for attending.
Therefore, this shows that there were important spillover effects within
departments in the decision to attend the benefits fair: Employees who
received the letter did induce some of their colleagues to attend the fair
with them.
Panel B of Table 8-1 displays 401(k) enrollment rates 5 and 11 months
after the fair, for each of the groups. The enrollment rates in treated
departments remained significantly higher (by about 20 percent) than in
control departments after 5 and 11 months, although the difference was
small is absolute terms (1 and 1.4 points, respectively). Interestingly, within
treated departments, the enrollment rate of those who did receive the
letter is no higher than for those who did not.
Three interpretations, not mutually exclusive, can account for these
results (Duflo and Saez, 2003). First, they could be explained by social
effects at the department level. Fair attendees might be able to spread informa-
tion gleaned from the fair in their departments, and therefore increase the
enrollment rates of their colleagues, even if the latter did not attend the fair
themselves. Second, the results might be explained by differential treatment
effects. Employees who went to the fair only because of the financial reward
are likely to be different from those who participate because of their col-
leagues, and it is plausible to think that the treatment effect would be larger
for the latter group than for the former. Finally, the results could be
explained by motivational reward effects. Paying people to attend the fair
140 Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez
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could have affected their subjective motivation and therefore the perceived
value or quality of the information they obtained at the fair.
Next we turn to new evidence from a follow-up questionnaire mailed after
the fair. We believe this information helps to show that the important deci-
sion about how much to save for retirement is affected by small shocks, such
as a very small financial reward and/or the influence of peers, and thus it
does not seem to be the consequence of an elaborate decision process.
Five months after the benefits fair, a follow-up questionnaire was sent to
917 employees. This included two questions designed to measure employee
knowledge of university retirement benefits system, as well as questions to
elicit information on alternative retirement savings options available and
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TABLE 8-1 Descriptive Statistics of Fair Attendance and 401(k) Participation, by 
Groups
Untreated Treated Departments
Departments
All (Group Treated Untreated (Group 
D  1) (Group (Group D  1,D  0)
D  1, L  0)
L  1)
Panel A: Benefits fair 
attendancea
Fair attendance rateb 0.049 0.214 0.280 0.151
among non-401(k) enrollees (0.005) (0.006) (0.01) (0.008)
Observations 2,018 4,126 2,020 2,106
Panel B: 401(k) participationc
401(k) participation rate 0.040 0.049 0.045 0.053
after 4.5 months (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 1,861 3,726 1,832 1,894
401(k) participation rate 0.075 0.088 0.089 0.088
after 11 months (0.0065) (0.005) (0.0071) (0.007)
Observations 1,633 3,246 1,608 1,638
Panel C: Response rate to 
additional questionnaire
Response rate 0.352 0.452 0.440 0.464
(0.0402) (0.018) (0.0201) (0.0405)
Observations 142 765 612 153
a Panel A includes all individuals not enrolled in the 401(k) plan by September 2000.
b Average fair participation in the non-treated department was obtained from the 
registration information collected at the fair. Since only 75% of the participants registered,
participation was adjusted by a proportionality factor.
c 401(k) participation rates are obtained from administrative data.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ analyses.
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to measure the extent of procrastination. The questionnaire, reproduced in
the Appendix, provides additional perspectives regarding how the informa-
tion obtained at the fair boosted 401(k) enrollment, despite the fact that
the response rate was under 50 percent (Panel C of Table 8-1).2 Clearly, peo-
ple who responded are a select group. For example, those who responded
to the questionnaire were eight percentage points more likely to enroll
in the 401(k) after 6 months, compared to those who received it but did
not return the survey (the standard error is 1.7 percentage points). The
questionnaire itself had no causal effect on participation, because the
enrollment rate in departments where we sent questionnaires did not
increase relative to others.3 Thus, this difference is entirely due to selec-
tion.4 Moreover, those who received the questionnaire and did not respond
were less likely to enroll in the 401(k) after 6 months, than those who did
not get the questionnaire.5
Results from the follow-up survey appear in Table 8-2. People who
answered the questionnaire were more likely to have attended the fair than
people who did not: In the treated group, 43 percent of the questionnaire
respondents attended (while 28 percent of the entire treated population
attended), and in the control group, 29 percent of the respondents attended
(compared to 15 percent). The attendance difference (14 percent) is similar
to the difference in fair attendance between the two groups as a whole
(13 percent) recorded at the fair. Respondents overall reported very high
satisfaction rates with the fair. Yet, satisfaction was significantly higher for the
control group than for the treatment group (95 versus 85 percent), and the
difference was almost as large as the difference in fair attendance. Panel A
thus suggests either that the marginal fair participant induced by the reward
was less likely to find the fair useful (thus supporting the hypothesis of
differential treatment effects), or that having received the letter reduced fair
satisfaction (supporting the motivational reward effect hypothesis).
Panel B of Table 8-2 reports responses to the question “Why are you not
enrolled in the 401(k) plan?” for those who reported that they were not
enrolled (none of them were actually enrolled). They could check as many
answers as were applicable. Individuals in the treatment group were less
likely to report that they lacked information (20 versus 30 percent), the dif-
ference was significant at the 10 percent level. They were more likely to say
that they wanted to enroll soon but had not yet found the time (45 versus
36 percent), although the t-statistic was just 1.3.6 All other reasons for not
contributing were mentioned equally often by both groups, with “plan to
enroll soon” being the single most often cited reason for not contributing.
In Panel C, we match this answer with their subsequent behavior. Actual
behavior was correlated with intention (virtually no one who did not
declare that he intended to enroll did so) but it fell well short of intention.
Among untreated individuals, 17 percent of those who indicated they
planned to enroll did so, but among treated individuals, 10 percent did so.7
142 Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez
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TABLE 8-2 Analysis of Answers to Follow-Up Questionnairea and Standard Errors 
of the Difference Corrected for Clustering at the Department Levelb
Treated Departments
Treament Control Difference
(Received Invitation)
A. Fair participation and impressions
Benefits fair participation 0.43 0.29 0.14
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Benefits fair satisfaction (for those 0.85 0.95 0.10
who attended the fair) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 301 70
B. Response to question “Why are you currently 
not enrolled in the 401(k)?”
Not enough information 0.20 0.31 0.11
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Cannot afford to save for retirement 0.33 0.37 0.04
(0.03) (0.06) (0.08)
Plan to enroll soon but no time to do it yet 0.45 0.35 0.09
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
Other ways to save for retirement 0.22 0.24 0.02
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 255 62
C. Enrollment 6 months after the questionnaires
Plan to enroll soon 0.10 0.17 0.07
(0.03) (0.09) (0.1)
Do not plan to enroll soon 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
D. Response to question “Where do you obtain 
information about benefits?” 
Benefits fair 0.37 0.25 0.12
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Benefits information packet 0.77 0.93 0.16
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Personal visit to the Benefits Office 0.12 0.08 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Other information seminar 0.20 0.21 0.01
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Colleagues 0.25 0.31 0.06
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Family or friends 0.26 0.24 0.03
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Administrative officer 0.05 0.01 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 300 71
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Thus, treated individuals were more likely to have good intentions, but
they were also more likely to procrastinate.
Panel D shows the answer to the question “Where do you obtain informa-
tion about the 401(k) plan?” Not surprisingly, those in the treatment group
were more likely to say that they obtained it from the fair (and the differ-
ence, 11 percent, is close to the 14 percent difference in fair attendance).
However, they were less likely to obtain information from the benefits informa-
tion packet (77 versus 93 percent). Those two sources of information thus
appear to be substitutes. Other sources of information seem to be used
equally by both groups.
Panel E reports answers to the knowledge questions. The first question
asked whether the employee was not enrolled in the 401(k) plan (when
we sent the letter, none of them were). Second, we asked them whether they
knew the number of vendors with whom their Defined Contribution (DC)
benefits could be invested. Employees were automatically enrolled in the DC
plan at that firm, and they could choose to invest their contributions with
four different vendors. Many employees had more than one vendor. If they
did not make a choice, the benefits office randomly allocated them to one
vendor. The results show that treatment and control groups were about as
likely to know the number of vendors: 74 and 71 percent, respectively, ven-
tured to answer the question, and in total 60 percent of each group gave the
right answer.8 However, those who received the letter were significantly less
likely to report knowing their 401(k) plan status (94 versus 99 percent), and
they were also less likely to give the correct answer (89 versus 94 percent).9
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TABLE 8-2 Continued.
Treated Departments
Treament Control Difference
(Received Invitation)
E. Knowledge about benefits
Reported knew own 401(k) status 0.94 0.99 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Reported knew the number of vendors 0.74 0.71 0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Gave correct answer about 401(k) status 0.89 0.94 0.06
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Gave correct answer about pension plan 0.60 0.61 0.00
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 235 56
a All statistics are weighted by population weight.
b Sample is restricted to treated departments.
Source: Authors’ analyses.
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This could reflect some over-confidence on their part, since the letter was
sent only to those who were not contributing. The finding lends some sup-
port to the motivational reward hypothesis: In the group where fair attend-
ance was high, the treated group had less knowledge than the group that was
not directly treated.
In summary, then, our results show that participation in the fair did not
have a large impact on the information set of those who received the letter.
In fact, they seem to have substituted fair attendance for individual
research. The result was that they were more unsure about their actual
401(k) status, and to wrongly report themselves as contributing even
though they were not. However, they were less likely to think that they
suffered from a lack of information, and they were more likely to plan to
enroll soon. Of course, this does not imply that the fair had no impact on
the information set of those who went to the fair without the letter (used
here as the control group).
Discussion
This experiment had two striking findings bearing further comment. First,
there was a large spillover effect at the fair attendance stage. Second,
despite the large remaining difference in fair attendance, there was no
difference in 401(k) plan participation between treated and untreated
individuals within treated departments, while there was a significant differ-
ence in 401(k) plan participation between treated and untreated depart-
ments. As noted above, the fair attendance results are a clear indication of
social effects in the decision to attend the fair, but interpreting the 401(k)
plan participation results is more delicate. These could be due to social
effects, differential treatment effects, motivational reward effects, or a com-
bination of all three. Yet, the three different explanations have a common
feature: They all suggest that the decision to participate in the 401(k) plan
is affected by small changes in the environment, and not only by the infor-
mation content of the fair.
If our results were entirely explained by the social effects hypothesis, this
would imply that peer effects are very strong, as compared to the direct
effect of the fair. This could arise in two cases. One case would posit that
the fair conveys useful information to the fair participant which is then
completely diffused to his entire department. This could explain why indi-
viduals who received the letter did not participate in the 401(k) plan any
more than their colleagues who did not, and both, in turn participated
more than individuals in control departments. A second case would pro-
pose that when people see more colleagues attending the fair (or they see
others receive a letter inviting them to attend the fair), they are directly
induced to enroll in the 401(k) plan, irrespective of what those who went
to the fair learned at the fair or decided to do. Such peer effects do not
8 / Implications for Retirement Saving Decisions 145
Utkas-08.qxd  27/5/04  3:01 PM  Page 145
146 Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez
seem to stem from rational “herd behavior” in an environment where
information is scarce or difficult to obtain (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992). At the same time, however, there is clearly
no strong social pressure to conform to the decisions of the majority
regarding the 401(k) plan (as was true, for example, in Munshi, 2000).
Yet another explanation for our results is that the treatment effects
may have been different for the various groups: It was positive for those
who attended the fair because of their colleagues, but zero for those who
attended because of the monetary reward. Yet, even if the results were
entirely due to such differential treatment effects, so that social interactions
play no role in explaining the 401(k) enrollment rate results, social network
effects are still responsible for the increase in fair attendance among the
untreated individuals in treated departments. Hence, social network effects
still prompted some people to take steps which ultimately led them to
change their 401(k) plan participation decisions.
As noted, the results could also be partly explained by the motivational
reward effect. If true, this would also indicate that individuals’ decisions
can be influenced by small non-economic factors. When attending the fair
on their own, they were influenced by it, but they were not induced to go by
a $20 reward. A small perturbation in their motivation to attend the fair
thus influenced their final decision, which again indicates that decision-
making processes can be influenced by small changes in the environment.
In summary, a common theme across all these explanations is that the
participation decision is influenced by things other than new information
about costs and benefits of the 401(k) plan. Consequently, the decision to
participate in the 401(k) plan is not purely the outcome of a sophisticated
process of information-gathering and careful considerations of the alterna-
tives. This conclusion is consistent with a growing body of evidence on
retirement saving behavior showing that people believe that their saving
rate is too low (Choi et al., 2002), but that their plans to increase it are
rarely followed by action (Choi et al., 2002; Madrian and Shea, 2002), and
that retirement decisions are characterized by very strong inertia and
adherence to default rules (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2003). It is
important to emphasize, however, that the studies discussed analyze only
the decision to enroll and contribute to a 401(k) plan. Starting to con-
tribute to a 401(k) plan does not necessarily imply increased real saving,
since individuals may offset 401(k) savings by reducing other saving or
increasing their debt. Measuring the effects on total saving would require
more data on overall assets and liabilities.
Future Research
Next, we sketch several further experiments to shed light on questions
regarding the 401(k) enrollment decisions that remain unanswered.
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These experiments could be conducted within one large employer (in
which case, employees within the firm would be randomly allocated to dif-
ferent groups), or at several companies (in which case, employers would
be randomly allocated to different groups, and all employees would be
treated similarly within a firm). Answering these questions would improve
our understanding of the determinants of savings for retirement better,
and can help design plans that will better serve both employees and
employers.
Seminars versus Fairs
More focused information, in smaller groups, could have a larger impact
than a large-scale benefits fair: some groups are particularly in need of
information, and do not receive it through the regular channels such as
a general benefits fair. For example, the Bush administration proposed
a retirement plan that would match up to 50 percent of the first $1,000
of IRA or 401(k) contributions for low-income earners. Since eligibility
conditions depend in a complicated way on income and marital status, it
could be difficult to access precisely for the low-income families whom this
reform targeted. Employers might use payroll information to determine
who is likely to be eligible, and target information to these individuals
through specialized seminars.10
Many firms offer benefits information sessions to their employees.11 The
impact of such sessions could be enhanced if they were combined with
some of the interventions proposed below. New employees typically must
make a number of decisions (e.g. regarding health and flex benefits), so it
could be a good time to reach them. Compulsory information sessions for
new employees might be a method of informing new hires without requir-
ing financial incentives. Such sessions, however, might have no impact if
the “motivational reward” effect is too large, since employees might feel
that they are forced to attend and stop paying attention altogether.
Measuring the impact of compulsory information sessions on new hires’
decisions could be very useful.
Signing Up on the Spot
At the information session studied by Duflo and Saez (2003), the university
did not offer enrollment on the spot; instead, employees interested in the
401(k) plan had to pick up an enrollment packet to take home. Quite plaus-
ibly, the additional effort required and the time lapse could be enough to
undermine their resolve to enroll in the plan, especially if the reason that
default rules matter is because people are simply reluctant to spend any
time thinking about saving. In contrast, the “Save More Tomorrow” experi-
ment offered people the option to enroll right away in the plan, which had
greater success.
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Three different hypotheses on the impact of default rules are as
follows: there is information in the proposed default, individuals do
not think at all about retirement; and the default is a commitment device
that protects individuals from themselves. To distinguish between these,
we propose three different experiments. First, one could compare the
impact of regular information sessions with sessions where the employees
could enroll on the spot, assisted by someone from the benefits office. To
detect a clean effect, employees would be randomly allocated to sessions
with or without on the spot enrollment. Second, information sessions
with on the spot enrollment could be combined with default rules. The
information session could deliver exactly the same message as before,
but now enrollment would be the default option in one case, and non-
enrollment would be the default option in a second case. Combining
these two interventions would provide six groups that can be compared
with each other:
(1) no enrollment by default; no information session;
(2) no enrollment by default; information session with no option to
change choices on the spot;
(3) no enrollment by default, information session with option to change
choices on the spot;
(4) enrollment by default, no information session;
(5) enrollment by default, information session with no option to change
choices on the spot; and
(6) enrollment by default, information session with option to change
choices on the spot.
If the enrollment rates were higher in group 3 than in group 2, we could
conclude that the lack of salience of the 401(k) decision plays a big role
in the enrollment decision. In other words, focusing people’s attention on
the question, and getting them to make a decision at the moment when
they are focused, could have an important impact on the enrollment deci-
sion. It would also confirm that people spend very little time thinking
about very important financial questions, a conclusion which seems to
emerge from existing evidence, as argued above. If there were a difference
in enrollment rates of groups 2 and 3, but not between groups 5 and 6, we
could additionally conclude that when individuals think about the prob-
lem, they actually decide to remain in the 401(k).
A comparison between groups 2 and 4 (versus groups 1 and 3) would
also shed light on whether people interpret the default as information.
When the information session has taken place, people receive direct
information on what an employer thinks is appropriate, and in both cases,
they receive exactly the same information. Of course, the fact that the firm
decides to enroll the individual by default could be additional information.
But if the only reason why the default matters was that people see it as 
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a signal, we should see a much smaller difference between groups 2 and
4 than between groups 1 and 3. To make it even clearer, the information
session could provide precise recommendations, which differed across
types of individuals. In this case, the default enrollment (common across
individuals) should provide no additional information, and if it still
mattered, it would be for non-learning reasons.
To summarize, an experimental design combining variations on default
options, the ability to enroll right after an information session, and the abil-
ity to commit for the future, would allow plan designers and researchers to
understand more clearly what determines saving decisions.
Effect on Saving
The central question of interest remains whether access and contributions
to a 401(k) plan increase net saving, or whether people offset additional
401(k) saving with less other saving. The answer to this question is of course
critical: If 401(k) contributions crowd out other forms of saving, there is
little reason to offer tax subsidies to these programs. Many researchers have
tried to evaluate whether, in fact, 401(k) plans boost total saving, but the
analysis remains controversial.12
The key reason why the question is very difficult to answer is that one
cannot simply compare saving by workers enrolled in 401(k) with that
of workers who are not enrolled. People who do enroll may be otherwise
financially more savvy, and therefore likely to invest more, even in the
absence of a 401(k) plan. Even comparing employees in firms that offer a
plan to those in firms which do not offer a plan may not solve the problem,
if firms that offer 401(k) plans employ different types of people (Poterba
et al., 1996). The ideal experiment would be to randomly offer 401(k)
plans, or to boost 401(k) contributions of some workers but not others, and
then to measure the impact on net saving. Of course, this particular exper-
iment cannot be conducted. On the other hand, contribution rates in
401(k) plans can be significantly increased, by default rules and commit-
ment devices, and some of the experiments we propose above could have
the same impact. For example, one could track the saving rate of individu-
als hired just before and just after the introduction of default 401(k) enroll-
ment, and compare their saving and asset accumulation patterns over
several years. Another possibility would be to offer the “Save More
Tomorrow” program to a random group of individuals within a firm, and
compare the subsequent saving of those offered the program, versus the
rest. Of course in so doing, it would be important to compare all the assets
of those subjected (or not subjected) to the new policy. The difference
between the saving rates across the two groups could then be normalized
by the difference in 401(k) participation in the two groups, to obtain an
estimate of the effect of 401(k) enrollment on net saving. Ideally, both
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groups of individuals would be followed over several years, making such a
study expensive and yet these data would also provide the most useful
insights on the most important questions.
Appendix: Questionnaire Sent 5 Months 
After the Benefits Fair
Please answer the following 6 simple questions. You can check the “don’t
know” answer if you are not sure of an answer. Your answers will remain
strictly confidential and will be used for no purpose other than this 
study.
(1) In addition to your Basic Retirement Account, the university makes
a monthly contribution of 3.5 percent of your monthly salary to an
Individual Investment Account(s). You decide how this contribution should
be invested from a list of four investment companies.
Through how many investment companies are you currently investing
this contribution?
–One . . .
–Two . . .
–Three . . .
–Four . . .
–Don’t know . . .
(2) The university offers a supplemental retirement plan called the Tax-
Deferred Account (TDA) program. Through the TDA program, you can
add to your retirement savings by contributing a portion of your salary on a
pre-tax basis. You pay no taxes on these savings or the investment income
until you withdraw your funds. You decide how much to contribute and the
university deducts your contributions from your paycheck. You choose how
to invest your savings from a wide range of funds offered by four different
vendors.
Are you currently enrolled in the Tax-Deferred Account (TDA)?
–Yes . . .(go to question 4)
–No . . .
–Don’t know . . .
(3) [To be filled out only if you are not currently enrolled in the TDA]
Why are you currently not enrolled in the TDA (check all answers that
apply)?
–You do not have enough information on the TDA: . . .
–Right now, you cannot afford to save for your retirement: . . .
–You plan to enroll soon, but did not have the occasion to do it yet: . . .
–You save for your retirement through other means: . . .
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(3b) If you check the last answer, which other means are you using to save
for retirement:
–TDA through spouse’s employer: . . .
–Individual Retirement Account (IRA): . . .
–Employer provided pension plan (own): . . .
–Employer provided pension plan (spouse): . . .
–Other mutual funds: . . .
–Other . . .
(4) [To be filled out by everybody]
From which of the following sources do you get information about the
retirement plans (check all that apply)?
–The benefits information fair: . . .
–Benefits information packet: . . .
–You came in person to the Benefits office: . . .
–You attended an information seminar: . . .
–Colleagues: . . .
–Family or friends: . . .
–The Administrative Officer of your department: . . .
–None . . .
(5) Did you attend the university benefits information fair in the fall?
–Yes: . . .
–No: . . .
(6) If you did, did you find it useful?
–Yes: . . .
–No: . . .
Notes
1 While this evidence is suggestive, it might be contaminated by omitted variables,
correlated within the group, and correlated with the observed variables used to
predict aggregate participation rates.
2 This is a common problem. The survey on savings intention by Choi et al.
(2002a) had a response rate of 33%.
3 This result is well in line with previous results by Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz
(1995) showing that distributing pamphlets or advertisement about benefits is not
enough to change employees’ behavior.
4 Since we have shown above that the questionnaire had no causal effect on
enrollment, this is also a sign of selection.
5 In addition, the selection seemed to work differently in treated versus control
departments: The response rate for treated departments was 45% (Panel C), while it
was only 35% in control departments. It may thus not be very informative to compare
the responses across samples. On the other hand, network effects within departments
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seem to have played an important role here too. The response rates among treated
and untreated individuals within treated departments were essentially identical.
A plausible explanation is that those who had received the fair invitation letter were
able to tell their colleagues that the researchers delivered on the promise of sending
the reward. Since the response rates are the same, the assumption that the selection
process is the same is reasonable. Thus, we can compare the response among treated
and untreated individuals within treated departments. These responses are not rep-
resentative of the population in general, but representative of the segment of the
population that tends to respond to this type of questionnaire.
6 The difference is 9%, almost as large as the difference in fair participation: A
simple IV on the probability to report that one wants to enroll on whether an indi-
vidual went to the fair, using the letter as instrument, would thus give a coefficient
very close to 1, which is also what Madrian and Shea (2002) obtain: Virtually all
seminar attendees who were not yet enrolled in the plan were intending to enroll
soon after the seminar.
7 This is in the ballpark of other studies. Following the survey conducted by Choi
et al. (2001a), 14% of those who intended to enroll in the TDA did. Following the
financial education session in Madrian and Shea (2002), 14% of the attendees
(who all intended to enroll) did.
8 Those who did not answer are counted as having given the wrong answer.
9 Incidentally, this level of misclassification underscores the importance of work-
ing with administrative data when studying 401(k) savings behavior.
10 In the university we studied, many potentially eligible employees would need to
be reached with information sessions in Spanish, for example.
11 A phone survey we conducted with Fortune 500 companies revealed that 71% of
them conduct these sessions. See also other studies in this volume.
12 Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) argue that 401(k)s have increased saving while
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) argue they did not. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001)
summarize the most recent research on those issues.
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